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Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism
and Reform in New York State
By James R. May*
The State of New York’s constitution was perhaps the first
in the world to embody environmental constitutionalism, most
directly in what is known as its “Forever Wild” mandate from
1894, which provides:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter
acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now
fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest
lands.
They shall not be leased, sold or
exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public
or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold,
removed or destroyed.1
In contrast to many subnational environmental provisions,
courts in New York have regularly enforced Forever Wild.2 New
York’s Constitution also contains a remarkable mandate that
every twenty years voters decide whether to hold elections for
delegates to convene a convention to amend the state’s charter.3
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School.
Portions of this article are adapted from JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (Cambridge University Press, 2015),
reprinted with permission of copyright holder and author.
1. N.Y CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (originally Art. VII, Sec. 7);
Nicholas A. Robinson, “Forever Wild”: New York’s Constitutional
Mandates to Enhance the Forest Preserve 7-8 (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=la
wfaculty.
2. See, e.g., Ass’n for Prot. of Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 170 N.E. 902,
905 (N.Y. 1930) (holding that timber harvesting is inconsistent with “Forever
Wild” portion of New York State Constitution).
3. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2:

At the general election to be held . . . every twentieth year . . .
the question “Shall there be a convention to revise the
constitution and amend the same?” shall be submitted to and
decided by the electors of the state; and in case a majority of
the electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a
convention for such purpose, the electors of every senate
district . . . shall elect three delegates . . . [who] shall
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The next such referendum is November 7, 2017, and if it carries,
the state will hold its next constitutional convention in 2019.4
With the potential for a constitutional convention comes the
potential reexamination of the role of environmental
constitutionalism, including the Forever Wild provision.5 Some
welcome the opportunity for a convention as an opportunity to
advance
environmental
constitutionalism,
including
instantiating fundamental environmental rights:
[T]here is a compelling case for amending the New
York Constitution to provide for a right to the
environment. If not enacted via a convention, the
option exists for the legislature to adopt an
environmental right to submit to the voters.
Either way, New York deserves to recognize the
right to the environment.6
Others are skeptical, concerned “that a convention would
tamper with the “forever wild” guarantees.”7 If New York
amends its constitution to incorporate additional provisions that
provide for environmental rights, duties, responsibilities, and
remedies, it will hardly be alone.
Environmental
constitutionalism enjoys global ubiquity. About half of the
world’s constitutions guarantee a substantive right to a clean or
quality or healthy environment explicitly or implicitly, and
about half of those also guarantee procedural rights to

convene . . . on the first Tuesday of April next ensuing after
their election . . . [and] [a]ny proposed constitution . . . shall
be submitted to a vote . . . not less than six weeks after the
adjournment of such convention.
Id. See generally PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996) (discussing the history and significance of New
York’s constitution).
4. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2. See Peter J. Galie & Gerald Benjamin,
Introduction, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS
AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS 1, 1-33 (Peter J. Galie, Christopher
Bopst & Gerald Benjamin eds., 2016) [hereinafter NEW YORK’S BROKEN
CONSTITUTION], for a discussion on needed reform constitutional reform.
5. See COMM. ON THE N.Y. STATE CONST., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, THE
CONSERVATION ARTICLE IN THE STATE CONSTITUTION (ARTICLE XIV) 1-6 (2016).
6. Nicholas
Robinson,
Updating
New
York’s
Constitutional
Environmental Rights, 38 PACE L. REV. 152, 181 (2017).
7. Id. at 177.
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information, participation or access to justice in environmental
matters.8 Nearly seventy constitutions specify that individuals
have responsibilities or duties to protect the environment9 and
others include directive principles of state policy. A few national
constitutions address specific environmental endowments
including water, flora, and fauna, while others define the
environment in certain ways, including as a public trust or in
terms of sustainable development.10
What is often overlooked is the extent to which some state
constitutions in federal systems—including Germany, Brazil,
and the United States—include environmental provisions, some
of which are even more elaborate than their counterparts at the
national level.11 Indeed, especially in the age of climate change
denial and the anthropocene, subnational government—states,
8. See, e.g., JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
(2016)
[hereinafter
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM]; James R. May, Symposium on Global Environmental
Constitutionalism: An Introduction and Overview, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 139
(2015); Erin Daly & James R. May, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania: A
Model for Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 151 (2015);
Erin Daly & James R. May, Comparative Environmental Constitutionalism, 6
JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 9 (2015); James R. May, Constitutional Directions in
Procedural Environmental Rights, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 27 (2013); James R.
May & Erin Daly, Constitutional Environmental Rights and Liabilities, 3
ENVTL. LIABILITY 75 (2012); James R. May & Erin Daly, New Directions in
Earth Rights, Environmental Rights and Human Rights: Six Facets of
Constitutionally Embedded Environmental Rights Worldwide, 1 IUCN ACAD.
ENVTL. L. E-J. (2011); see also LOUIS KOTZE, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ANTHROPOCENE (2017), DAVID R. BOYD, THE RIGHT
TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT: REVITALIZING CANADA’S CONSTITUTION 65 (2012);
RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (2009); TIM HAYWARD,
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS (2005).
9. See, e.g., BENIN CONST. art. 27 (“Every person has the right to a healthy,
satisfying, and lasting environment and has the duty to defend it. The state
shall watch over the protection of the environment.”); CHECHNYA CONST. art.
55 (“Everyone is obliged to preserve nature and prevent damages, as well as to
be careful with removing natural riches.”); INDIA CONST. art. 51A (“It shall be
the duty of every citizen of India . . . to protect and improve the natural
environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have
compassion for living creatures . . . .”).
10. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
260-269, for a more in-depth discussion.
11. See id. at 236-254; see also James R. May & William Romanowicz,
Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 306-307 (James R. May, ed., 2011).
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provinces, Länder, cantons, or what is sometimes referred to as
the meso-level, which exists between the national government
and local governments—are the final frontier in constitutional
environmental rights.12
Subnational constitutionalism is
worldwide, advancing myriad civil, political and socio-economic
rights, and often filling gaps in federal systems.13 Many
subnational governments have their own constitutions, which
can provide the most direct mechanism for advancing local
interests, including environmental constitutionalism.14 Led by
states in the Americas in general, and Brazil in particular,
subnational governments around the globe have seen fit to
constitutionalize substantive and procedural environmental
rights, environmental duties, and sustainable development for
present and future generations, often with much more specificity
and enforceability than provided in national constitutions.
Subnational instantiation of constitutional environmental
rights can have special salience in countries that have yet to
recognize environmental rights at the federal level, including
the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York has much
to learn from subnational experiences in environmental
constitutionalism elsewhere.
This article has three parts. Part I provides a primer to the
field of subnational environmental constitutionalism. Part II
explores the opportunities and challenges in enforcing existing
subnational environmental provisions. Part III then examines
a case study involving language to consider at a constitutional
convention for the State of New York.
I. A Primer on Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism
Subnational provisions stand apart from their national
counterparts, if any, and warrant independent examination.
Subnational developments at the constitutional and judicial
12. James A. Gardner, In Search of Subnational Constitutionalism 1-2
(Buff. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017239.
13. See Sylvia Ewald, Note, State Court Adjudication of Environmental
Rights: Lessons from the Adjudication of the Right to Education and the Right
to Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 414-417 (2011).
14. See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8

4

MAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

10/23/17 10:10 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

125

levels can be instructive and illustrative. For example, some
environmental constitutional provisions are much more
elaborate and intricate than national analogs. Developments at
the state level can be thought of as “happy incidents” to advance
innovations in law, including in constitutional law and
environmental constitutionalism. Brown for one contends that
experiences in U.S. states with environmental constitutionalism
could provide Eastern Europeans with models for making such
environmental provisions self-executing and enforceable.15
Unfortunately, judicial developments at the state level in
the United States have not been terribly encouraging, as
Thompson has observed: “[s]tate courts also have helped ease
most of the constitutional provisions into relative obscurity by
holding that the provisions are not self-executing, by denying
standing to private citizens and groups trying to enforce the
provisions, or by establishing relatively easy standards for
meeting the constitutional requirements.”16
Nonetheless,
subnational constitutions can provide the additional proving
ground for environmental constitutionalism around the globe
because such provisions (if they exist) tend to supply a vital link
to the dual objectives of protecting the environment and
promoting environmental human rights.
A. The Extent of Subnational Environmental
Constitutionalism
Subnational environmental constitutionalism enjoys—or
suffers—from many of the same attributes as does its national
counterpart. Yet it offers largely untapped opportunities to
embed substantive, procedural and other environmental rights
in ways most likely to have the greatest effect at the local level,
where environmental degradation is most likely to be sustained
and where its effects are most likely to be experienced by people

15. See Elizabeth F. Brown, Comment, In Defense of Environmental
Rights in East European Constitutions, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 191,
191-192.
16. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the
Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions,
64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2003) [hereinafter Thompson, Montana’s
Environmental Provisions].
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in their communities.
Subnational environmental constitutionalism offers several
advantages over national treatment.
First, subnational
constitutions can reflect local environmental concerns that can
be ignored or underserved by the national constitution, even
when those concerns may address global challenges. For
example, the Dutch provinces of Zeeland, North Holland,
Friesland, and Groningen address climate change and
sustainable development, problems that the national
constitution does not reach.17
Second, subnational constitutions can pay attention to
minutiae often lacking in national constitutions. Remarkable
examples of this are found in Brazil, whose state constitutions
delineate extensive governmental functions in the service of
substantive environmental rights, including promoting
biodiversity and sustainability, protecting species and water
quality, advancing conservation and environmental education,
and enforcing environmental requirements. The constitution of
the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso—which contains agricultural
land, part of the Amazon forest, and part of the Pantanal, one of
the world’s largest wetlands—is typical in this regard. To
“ensure the effectiveness” of substantive environmental rights
there, it impels the subnational government to:
4 Safeguard the rational and sustainable use of natural
resources to ensure its perpetuation and minimize
environmental impact;
4 Preserve the diversity and integrity of the genetic
heritage;
4 Establish the state policy of sanitation and water
resources;
4 Require, for the installation of work or activity that may
potentially cause significant degradation of the
environment, a prior environmental impact study,
which shall be made public, guaranteed the community
participation through public hearings and their

17. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
211.
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representatives at all stages;
4 Fight pollution and erosion;
4 Inform, systematic and broadly, the population about
pollution levels, the quality of the environment,
situations that risk accidents, the presence of
substances potentially harmful to health in drinking
water and food, as well as the results of audits and
monitoring;
4 Promote environmental education at all school levels
and public awareness for the preservation of the
environment;
4 Stimulate and promote the restoration of native
vegetation coverage in degraded areas, aiming at the
achievement of minimum standards necessary to
maintain the ecological balance;
4 Protect the fauna and flora, ensuring the diversity of
species and ecosystems, with prohibition, in the manner
prescribed by law, to practices that endanger their
ecological function and cause the extinction of species or
subject animals to cruelty;
4 Create, deploy and manage state and local conservation
units representative of existing ecosystems in the State,
restoring its essential ecological processes, and the
alteration and suppression may only be allowed by law,
with prohibition to any use that compromises the
integrity of the attributes that justify its protection;
4 Control and regulate, where applicable, the production,
sale, and use of techniques, methods, and substances
that represent a risk to life, quality of life and the
environment;
4 Relate the participation in biddings, access to tax
benefits, and official credit lines to environmental
compliance, certified by the competent agency;
4 Define, create and maintain, in the manner required by
law, vital areas for the protection of natural caves,
archaeological sites, remarkable natural landscapes,

7
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other assets of historical, touristic, scientific and
cultural value;
4 Define territorial spaces and their components to be
specially designed for the creation of protected
environmental areas and preserved goods of cultural
value as a historic site;
4 Promote anthropogenic and environmental zoning of its
territory, establishing consistent and differentiated
policies for the preservation of natural environments,
striking landscapes, water sources, areas of ecological
interest within the State, from a physiographic,
ecological, water and biological standpoint;
4 Promote technical and scientific studies aiming to
recycle discarded raw materials, as well as encourage its
application in economic activities;
4 Stimulate research, development and use of alternative
energy sources, clean and energy saving technologies;
and
4 Ensure, in the manner prescribed by law, free access to
basic information about the environment.18
Most Brazilian states similarly dictate governmental means
for implementing substantive environmental rights, including
the States of Amazonas, Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás,
Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Paraná,
Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do Norte,
Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and Tocantins, and in the Federal
District.
Third, subnational constitutions can combine multiple
facets of environmental constitutionalism in a single swath,
which can be more challenging at the national level due to the
challenges outlined in Part I. For example, Article 57 of the
proposed Kurdish Regional Constitution of Iraq contains a
cavalcade of environmental rights, including individual rights
and responsibilities, governmental policies, and sustainability,
in a sort of environmental omnibus provision, which provides:
18. See id. at 219-21.
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First: Environmental protection (land, water, air,
plants and animals) is a responsibility of all and if
anyone causes damage to them, they are
responsible to fix it and to be punished by law.
Second: All citizens have a legitimate right for
freedom and equality in an appropriate living
status, in a social and economical environment
which will provide a prosperous and happy life
and has a responsibility for protecting the
environment and improving it for the present and
future generations.
Third: The Regional Government shall take action
to mitigate and treat the sources of pollution in
the environment, and in regard to this it, strives
to develop forests and protect the fields and
protect the green zones inside the cities and their
outskirts. The Regional Government shall
develop, enlarge and construct public parks,
natural parks for protecting animals, plants, and
natural resources and prohibit buildings and
institutions and the use of machines and
instruments in the natural protectorates.19
As of 2013, this draft has not yet gone into effect, but as
written, it stands as a model of the potential for environmental
constitutionalism; this, despite the fact that control over the
land and resources remains in dispute between the regional and
national governments.
Fourth, subnational environmental constitutionalism can
provide enhanced opportunities for coordinated national-state
implementation of national environmental policies.
For
example, as Michael Kelly describes, the Kurdish Regional
Constitution within the framework of the Iraqi Federal
Constitution allows for shared responsibility for environmental
policy.20 Kirsten Jörgensen notes that “[t]en out of the twenty19. See Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the
Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil,
Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 707, 784 (2010).
20. Id. at 727-28.
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eight states of India (Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh,
Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West
Bengal, Kerala, and Orissa) are implementing major wind
energy programmes,” under the aegis of the federal
constitution.21 At times, the allocation of responsibility for the
environment between the local and the national government can
give rise to political tensions and even military action when the
local and national goals are at odds or when the revenues
produced by exploitation of natural resources have to be
equitably shared; most often, however, constitutional
environmental provisions can promote inter-governmental
cooperation.
Such national-subnational coordination is fairly common.
For example, states that make up the Ethiopian federation
(Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari,
Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Regional
State (SNNPRS), Somali, and Tigray), “share the . . .
environmental policy objectives” reflected in the national
constitution.22
Other
federal
constitutions
explicitly
delegate
environmental protection to subnational entities, including
Spain,23 Germany, and the Netherlands.24 Hudson notes that
the federal Canadian Constitution “contains explicit language

21. Kirsten Jörgensen, Climate Initiatives at the Subnational Level of the
Indian States and Their Interplay With Federal Policies (March 2011)
(presented at the 2011 ISA Annual Convention), http://www.diss.fuberlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_0000000021
09/isa11_joergensen_draft.pdf.
22. Tsegaye Regassa, Sub-National Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards
Entrenching Constitutionalism at State Level, 3 MIZAN L. REV. 33, 1-2, 51 n.85
(2009).
23. See Kelly, supra note 19, at 763-64.
24. See Kirsten Jörgensen, Governance for Sustainable Development in
the German Bundesländer, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SUBNATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS: POLICY-MAKING AND MULTI-LEVEL INTERACTIONS 103, 109-15
(Hans Bruyninckx et al., 2012) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] (“As
a result of the 2006 federalism reform, the distribution of powers has changed
slightly to favor the Bundesländer. This reform provided the Bundesländer
the right to deviate from federal law in the areas of nature conservation,
landscape planning, and water and flood water management . . . .”); Frans
H.J.M. Coenen, Dutch Provincial Sustainable Development Policies: Ambitions
and Differences, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 120, 121-25,
132-34.
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granting exclusive regulatory authority over subnational forest
policy to the provinces . . . . This is a significant state of affairs
since the Canadian provinces actually own or otherwise control
84 percent of the nation’s forests.”25 Indeed, the Constitution of
Canada provides in pertinent part “[i]n each province, the
legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to (a)
exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province;
(b) development, conservation and management of nonrenewable natural resources and forestry resources in the
province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary
production therefrom.”26
Fifth, even failed attempts to instantiate constitutional
environmental rights at the subnational level can contribute to
the enactment of legislative measures to achieve the same ends.
Boyd, for example, reports that negated efforts to advance
environmental constitutionalism at the federal and provincial
level in Canada contributed to the enactment of provincial
legislation recognizing substantive environmental rights in the
Northwest Territories, Nanavut, Ontario, Quebec, and the
Yukon.27 Ontario’s legislatively-enacted environmental “Bill of
Rights,” for instance, advances human and environmental rights
at the local level.28
Sixth, insofar as most citizens are mostly connected to their
state government and state authority is more likely to be
responsive to the needs of local communities, subnational
constitutionalism affords greater opportunities for both political
and legal action to enforce and promote environmental norms.
Cusak
observes
that
subnational
environmental
constitutionalism includes textual provisions “granting citizens
the right to a healthful environment; public policy statements

25. Blake Hudson, What Kind of Constitutional Design is Optimal for
Environmental Governance?, ENVTL. L. PROFESSOR BLOG (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2012/02/what-kind-ofconstitutional-design-is-optimal-for-environmental-governance.html.
26. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app II, no 92A(1) (Can.).
27. See BOYD, supra note 8, at 61-66.
28. Id. at 63-65. For a discussion of Ontario’s approach to environmental
constitutionalism, see Sandra Walker, The Ontario Environmental Bill of
Rights, in ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: LAW, LITIGATION & ACCESS TO JUSTICE 2032 (Sven Deimann & Bernard Dyssli eds., 1995).
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concerning preservation of natural resources; financial
provisions for environmental programs; [and] clauses that
restrict the environmental prerogatives of state legislatures.”29
And finally, subnational environmental constitutionalism
can provide experience in a country that can normalize
environmental constitutionalism and goad activity at the
national level. This has happened in Argentina, where, as
Hernandez notes, the Province of Córdoba’s constitutional
environmental rights preceded those that followed at the
national level.30
B. Textual Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism
Subnational environmental constitutionalism has gained a
foothold throughout the globe, including in Austria, Argentina,
Brazil, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iraq, Netherlands, the
Philippines, and the United States.31
The Brazilian brand of subnational environmental
constitutionalism is especially striking. Spurred on initially by
the Rio Declaration in 1992 (and buffeted by the Rio+20
Conference in 2012), the most ardent examples of subnational
environmental constitutionalism occur at the state level in
Brazil.32 The constitutions for all of Brazil’s twenty-six states—
29. Mary Ellen Cusack, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
173, 181 (1993); Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson & Nicholas Targ, Human Rights
and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 359, 390 (2004) (“Environmental constitutional provisions at the state
level, however, have fared better than at the federal level. Every state
constitution drafted after 1959 explicitly addresses ‘modern concerns’
regarding pollution control and preservation. Indeed, fully one-third of all
state constitutions include: (1) policy statements regarding the importance of
environmental quality; (2) environmental enabling language; and/or (3)
language creating an individual right to a clean and healthy environment.”)
(footnotes omitted).
30. ANTONIO MARIA HERNANDEZ, SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
ARGENTINA 24 (2011).
31. Joseph Marko, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutionalism, and the
Protection of Minorities, RUTGERS U. CTR. FOR ST. CONST. STUD. (2015),
http://statecon.camden.rutgers.edu/sites/statecon/files/subpapers/marko.pdf
(“Several land constitutions . . . contain provisions for the protection of the
environment.”).
32. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20,
June 20-22, 2012, Rio+20 Outcome Document, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288; United
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and the Federal District—promote environmental protection,
often elaborately and identically so.33
The Mato Grasso
constitution is typical, touching all corners of environmental
constitutionalism by guaranteeing substantive and procedural
rights and imposing duties and responsibilities that apply to all
for the benefit of present and future generations.
Notably, the constitutions of most Brazilian states and the
federal district embed a substantive right to a quality
environment in some form, most commonly to a “balanced”
environment. For example, the constitution of the State of Acre
provides that “[a]ll have the right to an ecologically balanced
environment.”34 Amapá’s Constitution provides that “[a]ll have
the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is an
asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life.”35
Amazonas’ Constitution says that “[a]ll have the right to a
balanced environment, essential to a healthy quality of life.”36
Ceará’s Constitution refers to a “balanced environment” as an
“inalienable right.”37
Goiás’ Constitution guarantees “an
ecologically balanced environment.” Mato Grosso’s Constitution
says that: “[a]ll have the right to an ecologically balanced
environment.”38 Maranhão’s Constitution calls a balanced
environment “an asset of common use and essential to people’s
quality of life, imposing to all, and especially the State and the
Municipalities, the duty to ensure their preservation and
restoration for the benefit of present generations and future.”39
Similar provisions recognizing a substantive right to a balanced
environment are found in the constitutions of the States of
Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Paraíba,
Paraná, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do

Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, June 20-22, 2012,
Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.215/16 (Sept. 28, 2012).

33.
221-22.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
225-26.
39.

See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
Id.
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Norte, Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and the Tocantins, and in the
Federal District.40 A couple of states vary slightly from the
“balanced” formulae, including Mato Grosso Sol, which provides
that “[a]ll have the right to enjoy an environment free of physical
and social factors harmful to health.”41
The constitutions of most Brazilian states express
environmental rights in terms of duties and responsibilities that
are owed by all for the benefit of present and future generations.
For example, Espírito Santo’s constitution reads that: “[a]ll have
the right to an ecologically, healthy and balanced environment,
and it is incumbent upon them and in particular to the State and
the Municipalities, to ensure its preservation, conservation and
restoration for the benefit of present and future generations.”42
Likewise, Mato Grasso’s Constitution imposes a duty on the
state, municipalities, and “the community” “to defend and
preserve” the environment “for present and future generations,”
while Acre’s Constitution says that “both the State and the
community shall defend [the environment] and preserve it for
present and future generations,” and Amapá’s Constitution
stating that “both the Government and the community shall
have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future
generations.”43
The constitutions of some Brazilian states specifically
elevate the interests of nature. For example, Bahia’s says that
“[i]t is incumbent upon the State, beyond all powers that are not
prohibited by the Federal Constitution, to . . . protect the
environment and fight pollution in any of its forms, preserving
the forests, fauna and flora.”44 It remains to be seen whether
provisions such as this create a “right” on behalf of nature.
Subnational deployment of environmental rights in the
United States is instructive because it underscores both the
potential and limitations of environmental constitutionalism.45
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
225-26.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Richard O. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful
Environment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063, 1103-05 (1992) (supporting
“decentralization” of constitutional provisions that address the environment,
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While all efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution to recognize
environmental rights have failed,46 states in the United States
have a long tradition of constitutionalizing environmental
protection.
Indeed, constitutional recognition of natural
resources and the environment at the subnational level in the
United States harkens back almost two centuries, beginning in
1842 with Rhode Island’s protection of “all the rights of fishery,
and the privileges of the shore . . . .”47 Among the more notable
provisions is the “Wildlands Forever” provision of the New York
State Constitution, which provides that:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter
acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now
fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest
lands.
They shall not be leased, sold or
exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public
or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold,
removed or destroyed.48
Presently, there are over two hundred natural resource or
environment-related provisions in forty-six state constitutions.
These provisions reach nineteen different categories of natural
resources or the environment, including water, timber, and
minerals.49 They also take eleven different forms, including
observing “[s]tate judges [would] . . . be more sensitive in weighing the state’s
environmental values.”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and
State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 863, 867 (1996) [hereinafter Thompson, Environmental Policy]; Janelle P.
Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing
Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 INT’L
LEGAL PERSP. 185, 185-87 (1999); Thompson, Montana’s Environmental
Provisions, supra note 16, at 174.
46. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional
Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013 (2004).
47. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 17. For a thorough history of the evolution
of Rhode Island’s Constitution, see Kevin D. Leitao, Rhode Island’s Forgotten
Bill of Rights, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 31, 58 n.68 (1996).
48. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Ass’n for the Prot. of the
Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 170 N.E. 902, 905 (N.Y. 1930) (timber harvesting
inconsistent with “Forever Wild” portion of New York State Constitution).
49. Bret Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions
in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 74-75 (2002). The
categories are:
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general policy statements, legislative directives, and individual
rights to a quality environment.50
States recognizing
environmental protection as an overarching state policy include
Louisiana,51 Michigan,52 Ohio,53 South Carolina,54 and
Virginia.55 Several more address parochial environmental
concerns, such as access to water, preservation, re-development,
sustainability, pollution abatement, climate change, energy
reform, or environmental rights.56
Dozens more contain
(1) public land acquisition/preservation/management, (2)
public ownership of land and other resources, (3) sovereignty
issues, (4) use/development balance, (5) school trust lands,
(6) public trust doctrine, (7) takings/eminent domain/conde
mnation power, (8) water access rights, (9) water rights, (10)
water development and reclamation, (11) water resource
protection, (12) mining and mineral rights, (13) fish and
wildlife, (14) fishing access, (15) hunting and fishing
restrictions, (16) rights of way, (17) timber and forest
management, (18) nuclear power, and (19) agriculture.
Id. at 74-75.
50. Id. at 75. The other manifestations include provisions respecting (1)
legislative protection, (2) agency authority, (3) general financing, (4) taxing
authority, (5) bonding authority, (6) funds and trust accounts, (7) educational
programs, and (8) private liability. Id.
51. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”).
52. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 51 (“The legislature shall pass suitable laws
for the protection and promotion of the public health.”).
53. OHIO CONST. art VIII, §2q (“Environmental and related conservation,
preservation, and revitalization purposes. . . are proper public purposes of the
state and local governmental entities and are necessary and appropriate
means to improve the quality of life and the general and economic well-being
of the people of this state . . . .”).
54. S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The health, welfare, and safety of the lives
and property of the people of this State and the conservation of its natural
resources are matters of public concern.”).
55. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“To the end that the people have clean air, pure
water, and the use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands,
waters, and other natural resources, [and] its public lands . . . . Further it shall
be the Commonwealth’s policy to protect the atmosphere, lands, and waters
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and
general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.”).
56. Of course, whether to categorize a constitutional provision as
addressing the environmental or resources involves some measure of
subjectivity. For example, Eurick, supra note 45, at 201, puts the number at
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provisions fairly characterized as recognizing that the state
holds state resources in “public trust.”57 Currently, five states
instantiate a substantive right to a quality environment:58
Hawaii,59
Illinois,60
Massachusetts,61
Montana,62
and
Pennsylvania.63 These provisions are independent of state laws
that allow citizens to enforce pollution control statutes.64
While most provide a “right” to the “environment,” the
adjectival objective – “clean” or “healthful” or “quality” – differs
from state to state. For example, Hawaii’s and Montana’s
Constitutions aim to afford a “clean and healthful
environment,”65 Illinois’s “a right to a healthful environment,”66
Massachusetts’s a “right to clean air and water, freedom from
twenty-one.
57. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public
Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State
Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010).
58. See Cusack supra note 29, at 181 (noting amendments to state
constitutions include “those granting citizens the right to a healthful
environment; public policy statements concerning preservation of natural
resources; financial provisions for environmental programs; and clauses that
restrict the environmental prerogatives of state legislatures.”); see also EDITH
BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 416
(1998) (identifying Illinois, Hawaii, California, Florida, Massachusetts,
Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia as embedding
environmental rights).
59. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
60. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
61. See MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.
62. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. See generally Bryan P. Wilson, State
Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big Sky
Falling?, 53 EMORY L.J. 627 (2004); Thompson, Montana’s Environmental
Provisions, supra note 16, at 158 (discussing Montana’s finding of a
fundamental right to a “healthful environment”).
63. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
64. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution
Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part I - An Interpretive
Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693 (1999) [hereinafter
Dernbach I] (explaining purpose of provision).
65. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (“Each person has the right to a clean and
healthful environment.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (guaranteeing “right to
clean and healthful environment . . . .”); see generally Wilson, supra note 62.
66. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (“Each person has the right to a healthful
environment.”).
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excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic,
historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment,”67 and
Pennsylvania’s “a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment.”68
These provisions have been interpreted to require harm to
humans. For example, in Glisson v. City of Marion, the Supreme
Court of Illinois explained that: “[t]he primary concern of the
drafters . . . was the effect of pollution on the environment and
human health. The right to a ‘healthful environment’ was
therefore not intended to include the protection of endangered
and threatened species.”69 Yet Montana’s suggests biocentric
concerns, choosing both “clean and healthful” over “healthful”
out of concern that the latter would permit the environmental
degradation of Montana’s most environmentally pristine areas
so long as the pollution didn’t harm human health.70
Of course, environmental constitutionalism has little
traction in subnational governments that either lack a
constitution or a bill of rights. Super-subnational environmental
constitutionalism by municipal and other local governmental
entities is also trending upward, particularly in subnational
governmental entities that operate under constitutional
mandates to promote environmental interests. Some of these
provisions can be even more protective and expansive than what
is typically found at the subnational and national levels, such
as, for instance, those American cities whose charters protect
rights of nature, including Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. A recent
study reports that many cities in the Philippines, including
Puerto Princesa, Naga, Quezon, and Makati Cities have adopted
local constitutional action plans to address various
environmental concerns, including climate change.71
67. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII (“The people shall have the right to clean air
and water . . . .”).
68. PA. CONST. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment.”).
69. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999).
70. MONT. LEGISLATURE ET AL., 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1971-1972 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1243-44 (1981).
71. ATENEO SCH. OF GOV’T, STUDY ON CARBON GOVERNANCE AT SUBNATIONAL LEVEL IN THE PHILIPPINES (2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8

18

MAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

10/23/17 10:10 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

139

Such super-subnational constitutionalism offers additional
and often unexercised potential for achieving environmental
objectives. In the United States, for example, as Professor
Michelle Bryan Mudd observes:
The local governments in environmental rights
states are poised to become leaders in this
endeavor by creating and implementing robust
environmental land use provisions. Yet that
leadership has been lacking to date. Whereas
state agencies in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana,
and Hawaii have integrated environmental
review into selected areas of state purview, local
governments
continue
to
leave
their
environmental authority largely unexercised.72
II. Judicial Receptivity to Subnational Constitutional
Environmental Rights
Constitutionally enshrined environmental standards at the
subnational level are most effective when they are recognized
enforced judicially.73 Yet amid the varied manifestations of
constitutionally-embedded environmental provisions at the
subnational level, one commonality stands out: they are seldom
subject to substantive interpretation,74 leaving them dormant
and awaiting clarity through advocacy.75 This dearth in
applicable jurisprudence is likely due to judicial concerns about
recognizing and enforcing emerging constitutional features,76
72. Michelle Bryan Mudd, A “Constant and Difficult Task”: Making Local
Land Use Decisions in States With a Constitutional Right to a Healthful
Environment, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 61 (2011).
73. For a general discussion of enforcement in this context, see John C.
Tucker, Constitutional Codification of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. REV.
299 (2000).
74. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 313 n.28 (Haw.
2007) (explaining that, “[a]lthough this court has cited this amendment as
support for our approach to standing in environmental cases . . . we have not
directly interpreted the text of the amendment.”) (citations omitted)).
75. Constitutional provisions referred to from hereon may be found in
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, app. at 281-358.
76. See Robert A. McLaren, Environmental Protection Based on State
Constitutional Law: A Call for Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 123, 149150 (1990).
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restraining economic development and property rights, entering
what are often seen as political thickets,77 or providing causes of
action that may displace other legislative prerogatives granted
to affected persons, such as state citizen suits to enforce state
pollution control requirements.78
Principally, subnational constitutional environmental
rights are under-enforced because courts have not found them to
be self-executing. A constitutional provision is self-executing if
it is “a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be
enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and
it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles,
without laying down rules by means of which those principles
may be given the force of law.”79 Thus, a constitutional provision
that is self-executing requires nothing more from the legislature.
A constitutional provision that is not self-executing requires
implementing legislation to enforce.
In the United States, few state constitutions make clear
whether constitutionally-embedded fundamental environmental
rights are self-executing. Montana’s, Pennsylvania’s, and Rhode
Island’s Constitutions, for example, are silent about whether
their environmental rights are self-executing. Constitutions
from other states explicitly require subsequent legislative or
judicial action. The environmental rights provisions embedded
in Hawaii’s and Illinois’s Constitutions, for example, are
enforceable by “[a]ny person . . . through appropriate legal
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as
provided by law.”80 Massachusetts’s environmental rights
77. See A. E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58
VA. L. REV. 193, 194 (1972); McLaren, supra note 76 at 132; Thompson,
Montana’s Environmental Provisions, supra note 16, at 174; see generally
James R. May & Erin Daly, Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights
Worldwide, 11 OR. REV. INT’L. L. 365 (2009) (finding that obstacles to enforcing
state constitutional environmental rights are strikingly similar to those that
afflict enforcement of environmental rights provisions in national constitutions
worldwide).
78. See James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen
Suits, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 53, 53-56 (2004).
79. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY,
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 99 (8th ed. 1927));
see Cusack, supra note 29.
80. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; but cf. Cusack, supra
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provision seems to assume judicial action without requiring
intervening legislative action.81
The constitutions of some states in the U.S. contain a
parallel provision that imposes a duty upon the state to enact
laws to protect the environment, which suggests to some that
corresponding environmental rights provisions are not selfexecuting.82 For instance, Rhode Island’s Constitution provides
that, “it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for
the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral
and other natural resources of the state,”83 and Michigan’s that
“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the protection of the air,
water and other natural resources of the state from pollution,
impairment and destruction.”84 Some see the mandatory “shall”
as requiring legislative action to effectuate constitutional
environmental rights.85 Others see these provisions as merely
invoking “moral force”86 that does not create a separately
enforceable environmental right.87
Most state court decisions have found constitutionallyembedded provisions in state constitutions not to be selfenforcing. For example, in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental
Affairs,88 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the constitutional right to clean air and water does not afford an
independent means to challenge an agency’s decision to grant a
permit to operate a sewage treatment plant under the
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act.89 In Commonwealth
v. Blair,90 a state court held that the same right to clean air and
water does not provide a cognizable cause of action to gain access
note 29, at 182 (opining that Hawaii’s provision is self-executing).
81. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII (“The general court shall have the power to
enact legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights.”).
82. See Howard, supra note 77, at 198; see also McLaren, supra note 76,
at 133.
83. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (emphasis added).
84. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52 (emphasis added).
85. Howard, supra note 77, at 199.
86. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 165 (8th ed. 1927).
87. Howard, supra note 77, at 200; see McLaren, supra note 76, at 133.
88. Enos v. Sec’y of Envtl. Affairs, 731 N.E.2d 525 (Mass. 2000).
89. Id. at 532.
90. Commonwealth v. Blair, 805 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
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to water supply in violation of the Commonwealth’s Watershed
Protection Act: “[t]he judge correctly rejected the argument that
the Commonwealth is duty-bound to acquire interests related to
the protection of drinking water.”91
Moreover, state courts in the U.S. have held that state
attorneys general could not even enforce environmental rights
provisions absent implementing legislation.92 The leading case
is Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
state’s attorney general could not enforce the state’s
environmental rights provision without further grant of
authority from the state legislature.93 The court reasoned that
the provision did not grant the attorney general an unbridled
and undefined authority to enforce a vague constitutional
mandate to “natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values,”94 thus
exposing individual property owners to enforcement
consequences.95 Likewise, in State v. General Development
Corp.,96 a court in Florida held that the state attorney could not
enforce Florida’s constitutional “policy . . . to conserve and
protect its natural resources and scenic beauty,”97 to prosecute
unauthorized canal construction except under the auspices of
“the legislature’s enactment of over twenty specific general laws
that have explicitly given a state attorney the authority to
independently initiate civil suits on behalf of the state in other
areas concerning the health, safety, and welfare of Florida’s

91. Id. at 1018.
92. Some argue that such judicial reluctance is anathema to the core ideas
these provisions were designed to promote. See, e.g., McLaren, supra note 76,
at 135.
93. Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d
588, 594-95 (Pa. 1973).
94. Id. at 595.
95. Id. See, e.g., Cmty. Coll. of Del. Cty. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 482 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975) (in which the court noted that “while [Pennsylvania’s
environmental rights clause] may impose an obligation upon the
Commonwealth to consider the propriety of preserving land as open space, it
cannot legally operate to expand the powers of a statutory agency, nor can it
expand the statutory powers of the [state agency] as a practical matter here.”).
96. State v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 448 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
aff’d, 469 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1985); see McLaren, supra note 76, at 134.
97. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; see also McLaren, supra note 76, at 134.
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citizens and environment.”98
A few other cases suggest margin for judicial cognizance of
subnational environmental constitutionalism. The Supreme
Court of Alaska recently read that state’s “public interest”
constitutional standard for resource development to require that
courts take a hard look at whether state agencies adequately
considered the cumulative environmental impacts of oil and gas
leases.99 And the Supreme Court of Montana has subjected that
state’s environmental rights provision to strict scrutiny,100
although it has since been reluctant to enforce it.101
III. Case Study: Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights
Amendment
There are myriad ways to amend the New York State
Constitution to advance environmental outcomes. Chief among
these is to have it recognize a right to a healthy environment.102
Other proposals include those to have it limit greenhouse gas
emissions, establish land banks, incorporate the public trust
doctrine, provide a framework for regionalism and home rule,
protect marine life and habitat, conserve aesthetic and cultural
landscapes, adopting procedural protections and access to
courts, and addressing specific threats, such as toxic
substances.103
Some suggest that Pennsylvania’s “Environmental Rights
Amendment” is the leading example for consideration for
environmental amendments to New York’s Constitution.104 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which recently held that

98. Gen. Dev. Corp., 448 So. 2d at 1080.
99. Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl., Destruction, 311 P.3d 625 (Alaska 2013).
100. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236
(Mont. 1999).
101. See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 288
P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012).
102. See generally Robinson, supra note 6, at 179.
103. Paul Bray, “Forever Wild” The Treatment of Conservation and the
Environment by the New York State Constitution, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 243, 249-56.
104. See, e.g., William R. Ginsberg, The Environment, in THE NEW YORK
STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK (Gerald Benjamin ed., 1994) 221, 22129; Robinson supra note 6, at 179-80.
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individuals may enforce article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution – which both recognizes an individual right to a
quality environment and requires the state to “conserve and
maintain” public resources “for the benefit of all the people” —
against governmental agencies.105 In a remarkable decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejuvenated article I, section 27 of
Pennsylvania’s Constitution.106
In Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court struck as unconstitutional major parts of “Act 13” —a
state oil and gas law designed to promote “horizontal hydraulic
fracturing,” or “hydro-fracking.”107 The decision has some
important implications for environmental constitutionalism.
Section 27 of the state constitution is no accident.
Pennsylvania’s history includes improvident deforestation,
significant loss of biodiversity and wildlife, rampant
industrialization, and extensive surface and subsurface coal
mining. These activities have taken a significant toll on the
quality of the environment in the state. Accordingly, in 1971 by
constitutional referendum, the people of Pennsylvania adopted
the “environmental rights amendment” by a four-one margin.
Incorporated as article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, it provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic
and
esthetic
values
of
the
environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit
of all the people.108
The environmental rights amendment affords rights and
imposes public trust duties that are commensurate with other

105. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013), aff’d,
84 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2014), and aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds, 147 A.3d 536
(Pa. 2016).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1001-02.
108. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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constitutional prerogatives: “It is not a historical accident that
the
Pennsylvania
Constitution
now
places
citizens’
environmental rights on par with their political rights.”109 Act
27 was enacted based on “the mischief to be remedied and the
object to be attained,” namely, to address environmental
degradation in the state by promoting individual environmental
rights and requiring governmental authorities to hold natural
resources in public trust.110 Horizontal hydro-fracking, on the
other hand, is a relatively new engineering technique that can
be used to gain access to the natural gas and petroleum
embedded in deep shale “plays” a mile or deeper under the
surface of the earth.111 The Pennsylvania legislature enacted
Act 13 in 2012 to promote the development of the state’s
extensive “Marcellus Shale” play.112
Act 13 constituted a major revision to the state’s
longstanding Oil and Gas Act in several respects. First, it
preempted traditional zoning and planning by local
governments to regulate or ban hydrofracking by declaring that
state laws “occupy the entire field” of oil and gas regulation, “to
the exclusion of all local ordinances,” and thus, “preempt[s] and
supersede[s] [the] “local regulation of oil and gas operations.”113
Thus, local governments were not free to reach their own
decisions about whether and to what extent to allow
hydrofracking or to impose additional environmental
requirements.
Second, Act 13 required local governments to promote
hydrofracking, regardless of the wishes of their constituents or
concerns about potential adverse environmental effects.114 It
mandated that all local ordinances regulating oil and gas
operations “allow . . . for the reasonable development of oil and
gas resources,” and established strict time periods for local
review of proposals, wherein if not kept, the project was deemed
approved.115 While Act 13 prohibited drilling or disturbing areas
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 960.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 914-15.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 970.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 971.
Id. at 970.
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within specific distances of underground sources of drinking
water, streams, springs, wetlands, and other water bodies, it
required state environmental agencies to waive these
restrictions provided the developer submits “additional
measures, facilities or practices” to protect these waters.116 Act
13 also established a system to collect and allocate “impact fees”
designed to offset some of hydrofracking’s adverse
environmental effects.117 Thus, Act 13 essentially conscripted
local governments into the service of promoting state policy
prerogatives, which themselves reflected the goals of the oil and
gas industry.
Last, Act 13 prevented physicians from obtaining
information about the risks of exposure to certain chemicals
used in hydro-fracking unless they agreed to sign a
confidentiality agreement.118 It then subjected physicians who
released information about potential chemical exposure to civil
and criminal liability.119
Seven municipalities, an environmental organization, and a
physician challenged the constitutionality of Act 13 on a variety
of grounds, including as an affront to both section 27 and federal
and state substantive due process.120
In response, the state argued that section 27 is
unenforceable. It based its theory on an earlier case, Payne v.
Kassab, which held that section 27 “recognizes or confers no
right upon citizens and no right or inherent obligation upon
municipalities; rather, the constitutional provision exists only to
guide the General Assembly, which alone determines what is
best for public natural resources, and the environment
generally, in Pennsylvania.”121
While agreeing with the state’s interpretation of Act 27, the
116. Id. at 972-73.
117. Id. at 933.
118. Id. at 924.
119. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 924.
120. Id. at 914.
121. Id. at 942; see Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976); accord
Klink v. Commonwealth, 370 A.2d 389 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977). For an
informative discussion on the question of whether Pennsylvania’s amendment
is self-executing, see John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution
Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II - Environmental Rights
and Public Trust, 104 DICK L. REV. 97 (1999).
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lower court declared Act 13’s statewide zoning provisions to be
unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process and
struck the provisions of the law that required state agencies to
grant waivers to setback requirements.122 It also held that the
environmental plaintiffs and the physician lacked constitutional
standing.123
Both sides appealed to the seven-member
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The plurality determined that Act 13 contravenes section
27’s remonstration that the state holds natural resources “in the
public trust,” the court continued, “we agree with the citizens
that, as an exercise of the police power, [Act 13 is] incompatible
with the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources.”124 It observed: “As the citizens
illustrate, development of the natural gas industry in the
Commonwealth unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and
undeniably detrimental, impact on the quality . . . of
Pennsylvania’s environment, which are part of the public
trust.”125
In particular, the plurality found that preempting local
control over hydro-fracking “sanctioned a direct and harmful
degradation of the environmental quality of life in these
communities and zoning districts.”126 It also concluded that Act
13 unconstitutionally shifted the burden to some citizens to bear
“heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others” in
violation of section 27’s mandate that public trust resources be
managed for the benefit of all people.127
A fourth judge concurred with the outcome, but would have
overturned Act 13 as a violation of substantive due process
rights of local communities because it would “force
municipalities
to
enact
zoning
ordinances”
despite
“Pennsylvania’s extreme diversity,” noting that Act 13 did not
afford adequate “consideration to the character of the

122. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 484-85 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013), and aff’d in part,
rev’d on other grounds, 147 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2016).
123. Id. at 476-78.
124. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 985.
125. Id. at 975.
126. Id. at 980.
127. Id.
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municipality,” including geology, topography, environmental
quality, water supply, and economics.128
Two justices dissented and would have upheld Act 13 and
found that the environmental plaintiffs and the physician lacked
standing.129 Another justice did not participate in the decision.
A majority of the court also reversed the lower court’s
finding that various environmental plaintiffs lack constitutional
standing, ruling that they suffered “a substantial and direct
interest in the outcome of the litigation premised upon the
serious risk of alteration in the physical nature of their
respective political subdivisions and the components of their
surrounding environment. This interest is not remote.”130
Likewise, the majority upheld the standing of an affected
physician to challenge Act’s 13’s confidentiality requirement,
noting that such interests also were “substantial and direct,”
and that “existing jurisprudence permits pre-enforcement
review of statutory provisions in cases in which petitioners must
choose between equally unappealing options and where the third
option, here refusing to provide medical services to a patient, is
equally undesirable.”131 The two justices who dissented would
have upheld the lower court’s ruling that the environmental
plaintiffs and the physician lacked standing.132
The plurality’s opinion in Robinson Township reinforces
environmental constitutionalism insofar as it represents an
authentic attempt to engage the text of the environmental rights
amendment. First, it noted that section 27—much like many
provisions that provide such rights—vests two rights in the
people of the state. The first is a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment.133 The second is “a limitation
on the state’s power to act contrary to this right.”134 Importantly,
it held that these rights are equal in status and enforceability to

128. Id. at 1006-08 (Baer, J., concurring).
129. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1009-14 (Saylor, J., dissenting); id. at
1014-16 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 922.
131. Id. at 924.
132. See supra text accompanying note 16.
133. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951.
134. Id.
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any other rights included in the state constitution, including
property rights.135
Second, it enforced the “public trust” provisions, that is, the
obligations of the state to hold resources in the public trust for
all people.136 Because the state is the trustee of these resources,
the plurality held, it has a fiduciary duty to “conserve and
maintain” them: “The plain meaning of the terms conserve and
maintain implicates a duty to prevent and remedy the
degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public natural
resources.”137
Thus, according to the plurality in Robinson Township, a
constitutional requirement to hold resources in trust involves
two separate obligations. The first is “a duty to refrain from
permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or
depletion of public natural resources.”138 The second takes due
regard of present and future generations, and imposes a duty “to
act affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative
action.”139
These duties promote “legitimate development
tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with
the evident goal of promoting sustainable development.”140
The plurality’s approach also minimized the role of
balancing in environmental constitutionalism. Specifically, the
plurality rejected the “non-textual” balancing test in Payne v.
Kassab as “inappropriate to determine matters outside the
narrowest category of cases, i.e., those cases in which a challenge
is premised simply upon an alleged failure to comply with
statutory standards enacted to advance Section 27 interests.”141
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania General Assembly will need to
revise or scuttle Act 13.
Last, the plurality in Robinson Township emphasized that
the Environmental Rights Amendment serves both present and
future generations. Echoing sentiments from the majority
opinion in Minors Oposa, it observed: “By any responsible
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 953-54.
Id. at 957.
Id.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id. at 967.
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account, the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will
produce a detrimental effect on the environment, on the people,
their children, and future generations, and potentially on the
public purse, perhaps rivaling the environmental effects of coal
extraction.”142 In so doing, the plurality opinion, in particular,
advanced the purpose of the constitutional enshrinement of
environmental rights and public trust duties in the first place:
to promote environmental protection and advance individual
rights to a quality environment.
IV. Conclusion
Given the variety of subnational constitutional provisions
aimed at protecting all facets of the environment in myriad
ways, these textual and jurisprudential developments suggest
that subnational environmental constitutionalism is a source of
information, inspiration, and innovation at a constitutional
convention for the State of New York.

142. Id. at 976; see Minors Oposa v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res.,
G.R. No. 101083, 33 I.L.M. 173 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
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